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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the role of culture in determining the decision to live together 
(as married or unmarried couples). To examine this issue, we utilize data on first-
generation immigrants who arrived to the United States at or before the age of 5. 
We follow the epidemiological approach, indicating that the dissimilarities in the 
behavior of young-arrival immigrants originating from different countries, who 
grew up and live in the same country, can be interpreted as evidence of the 
existence of a cultural effect. Results show a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the cultural proxy, that is, the proportion of individuals living 
together by country of origin, and the immigrant choice of living with a partner. 
We extend this analysis to the examination of both married and unmarried 
cohabitation, separately, and to an exploration of the formation of same- or 
different-origin couples. In all cases, our findings suggest an important role of 
culture. The results are robust after controlling for several home-country 
observable and unobservable characteristics, and to the use of different 
subsamples. With respect to the transmission of culture, we show empirical 
evidence of horizontal transmission of culture. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Why does an individual choose to live with a partner? According to the World 
Values Survey (WVS), around 50% of the individuals living together (as 
married/unmarried couples) are very satisfied with their life (during the period 
2010 to 2014), whereas only 38% of the individuals not living with a partner 
(single/never married, divorced/separated or widowed) report the same level of 
satisfaction with their life.
1
 These dissimilarities in the level of satisfaction are 
also observed in other waves of the WVS and in other measures of wellbeing. For 
example, in the period 1989 to 1993, the WVS reveals that more than 80% of the 
individuals living with a partner approved of their life at home but, when 
responders do not live with a partner, less than 65% approved of it.
2
 Taking those 
differences into account, it can be argued that individuals choose to live with a 
partner because their happiness is more likely to be higher. Of course, this quick 
glance at the WVS does not provide a unique response to the variations in the 
level of satisfaction of individuals that depend on marital status. Men and women 
who tend to be more optimistic and happier can be more likely to live with other 
people, while living together or maintaining a relationship may not be so easy for 
unstable and/or unhappy people (Stutzer and Frey 2006). Social norms may also 
influence the perception of the level of satisfaction in each particular marital status 
(Diener et al. 2000; Kalmijn 2009; Soons and Kalmijn 2009). Individuals who 
remain without a partner as single or divorced are ostracized in some countries, 
decreasing their level of satisfaction, because that way of living is different from 
that established by the social norms (Furtado et al. 2013; Kalmijn and Groenou 
2005; Kalmijn and Uunk 2007). Then, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility 
that, if an individual does not want to be ostracized, they will follow the social 
norms (or culture) and will decide to live with a partner, pointing to the culture as 
a potential factor in the way-of-life decision. We focus on that issue in this 
analysis by exploring whether culture impacts the living-together decision. 
Getting married or living together as married can be affected by multiple 
factors that have been explored in the literature. Gary Becker, the Nobel laureate 
                                                            
1 Individuals are classified as very satisfied with their life if they report a level of satisfaction of 8, 
9 or 10. 
2 The WVS only includes a question relative to the satisfaction with the life at home, in the wave 
1989-1993. 
researcher of the economics of the family, had a particular interest in the marriage 
decision, focusing on the gains of marriage versus remaining single (Becker 
1973). The exploration of the determinants of the living-together decision has not 
lost its importance in the literature. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) revise the 
changes and the driving forces of marriage, divorce, and cohabitation, suggesting 
that the characteristics of individuals, such as their race, gender, and their 
educational level, appear to be related to the choice of marital status. Economic 
conditions (Ahituv and Lerman 2011; Bellido and Marcén 2017; González-Val 
and Marcén 2016), family laws (González-Val and Marcén 2012a; 2012b; 2016; 
Bellido and Marcén 2017; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), religion (Lehrer 2004; 
Lehrer and Chiswick 1993), parenthood (Bellido et al. 2016; Steele et al. 2005) 
and welfare reforms (Bitler et al. 2004) also appear to affect the transitions into 
and out of marriage. To our knowledge, none of the prior literature examines the 
issue proposed here; that is, the potential effect of culture on the decision to live 
with a partner. 
The importance of culture is a pertinent question for almost all of the 
researchers, but it is not easy to measure. Culture is normally defined as a set of 
beliefs and preferences that varies across space, time, and social groups 
(Fernández, 2007). Similarly, culture is described by UNESCO (2001) as the set 
of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a 
social group. Not only does this encompass art and literature, but it also includes 
lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions, and beliefs. This 
definition is interesting for our work, since it suggests that ways of living are part 
of the culture of a society. Our goal is to explore whether those aspects of culture 
do play a role in the living-together decision. To do that, we follow the 
epidemiological approach (Fernández 2007) by exploring the behavior of 
immigrants who arrived in the US at or before the age of 5, and whose ethnicity or 
country of origin is known. In order to capture the effect of culture, we exploit the 
variation in the proportion of individuals living with a partner (as married or 
unmarried couples) by country of origin. As the epidemiological approach 
establishes, since immigrant attitudes are probably similar to the preferences and 
beliefs of their parents, forbears, and ethnic communities, differences in the 
proportion of individuals living with a partner (married or unmarried) by home 
country can be interpreted as evidence of the existence of a cultural effect. 
This study contributes to the literature on the effect of culture on socio-
economic and demographic variables, which is becoming more and more common 
(Fernández 2011; Giuliano 2016). Related to our research are those studies that 
examine the impact of culture on living arrangements (Giuliano 2007), and 
divorce (Furtado et al. 2013). Giuliano (2007) finds that those individuals 
originating from countries whose counterparts leave the nest later in life are more 
likely to delay the decision to live without their parents. Furtado et al. (2013) 
show a positive relationship between the home-country divorce rates and the 
probability that the immigrants originating from those countries report being 
divorced. In addition, utilizing methodologies quite analogous to ours, there are 
several papers showing a role of culture on women’s labor force participation and 
fertility (Bellido et al. 2016; Contreras and Plaza 2010; Fernández 2007; 
Fernández and Fogli 2006; Fernández and Fogli 2009; Marcén et al. 2016), 
unemployment (Brügger et al. 2009), self-employment (Marcén 2014), the search 
for a job (Eugster et al. 2016), and even on the math gender gap (Nollenberger et 
al. 2016). 
Our sample is obtained from the 5% Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS) of the 2000 US census (Ruggles et al. 2015).
3
 The cultural proxy is 
calculated by utilizing data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
International (IPUMS International), Minnesota Population Center (2015), which 
allows us to measure the variable of interest more precisely by age and education, 
as in Marcén et al. (2016). Results point to culture as an important factor on the 
living-together decision. This is maintained after adding controls for unobservable 
characteristics (including country of origin fixed effects), regardless of the 
definition of the cultural proxy, and using different subsamples. Although, in the 
main analysis, we only consider the ethnic origin of heads of household, we have 
re-examined the effect of culture, taking into account the fact that individuals can 
live together with a partner of the same or different country of origin. If the impact 
of culture is meaningful, we would expect a greater role of culture on couples 
                                                            
3 The 2000 US Census was also used by Furtado et al. (2013) for an analysis of the effect of culture 
on divorce. As those authors explain, the choice of this dataset is due to the availability of 
sufficient data on first-generation immigrants for each country of origin, taking into account all our 
sample selection requirements, which are described in the Data section. In our case, the 2000 US 
Census is also appropriate in having enough countries of origin because the number of countries 
with information on the IPUMS International, used to calculate the cultural proxy, is considerably 
greater around the year 2000. This is explained in detail below. 
having the same country of origin than on those with different ethnic origins. That 
is what we observe. It is also worth noting that a separate gender analysis has been 
considered, to mitigate the concerns that the use of a sample of heads of 
household, who have traditionally been men (Hobbs and Stoops 2002), may 
generate. Our findings do not vary, but male householders appear to be more 
affected than female householders, which is not surprising if it is assumed that 
female householders are less likely to follow the traditional social norms. 
 In our main analysis, living together includes both married and unmarried 
couples. Unmarried cohabitation is accepted, even legally, as a variety of marriage 
in many countries, so that the only difference between married couples and those 
couples living together as married is that the former have a marriage license, while 
the latter do not (Lewin 1982; Smock 2000; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). 
However, in other countries, unmarried cohabitation is socially accepted as a 
temporary phase before marriage (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Stevenson and Wolfers 
2007). In this framework, the social norms regarding marriage could be different 
from those of unmarried cohabitation, which can generate doubts as to whether we 
are capturing the social norms affecting marriage decisions or those affecting 
unmarried cohabitation. To tackle this issue, we have divided the sample between 
married and unmarried couples. We find that culture is important in both cases.  
The final section presents evidence suggesting that culture can be 
transmitted horizontally. Using Census data, we are not able to study whether 
culture is transmitted vertically, that is, from parents to their children, since, 
unfortunately, there is no data on parents’ characteristics. However, we are able to 
examine whether an increase in the concentration of individuals of the same 
country of origin has an effect on the number of individuals who choose to live 
with a partner. As Furtado el al. (2013) and Marcén et al. (2016) show, that 
relationship may reflect the sensitivity of immigrants to the community in which 
they live, providing empirical evidence of a possible horizontal transmission of 
culture. These findings reinforce the idea that culture is important in the decision 
to live with a partner. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Baseline results and robustness 
checks are discussed in Section 4. Finally, section 5 sets out our main conclusions. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Measuring culture can be tricky, because of the interrelation among economic 
conditions, institutions, and social norms (Fernández 2007; Sevilla 2010), but 
Fernández (2007) proposes an empirical strategy to disentangle the effect of 
culture from that of markets and institutions, claiming that the epidemiological 
approach is a useful instrument to determine whether culture is an important factor 
in human behavior. Following that approach, we use data on immigrants who 
arrived in the US at a young age and whose country of origin or ethnicity is 
known. Those young-arrival immigrants have all grown up in the same country, so 
that, if only institutions and markets are important to the decision to live together, 
the home-country proportion of their counterparts living together (as married or 
unmarried couples) should have no impact on the decisions of those immigrants 
residing in the US. On the other hand, if culture does play a role in living 
arrangements, we would expect to detect a relationship between the behavior of 
the immigrants living in the US and that of their counterparts in their countries of 
origin. To test this issue, we estimate the following equation:
4
 
                                                      
where      is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when immigrant i of cultural 
origin j living in state k reports living together (in a married or unmarried couple), 
and 0 otherwise.
5
 Our measure of culture,      , is the proportion of individuals 
of country of origin j living with their partners. We revisit the definition of the 
cultural proxy below. In any case,
 
if culture plays a role here, immigrants from 
countries whose counterparts tend to choose to live together as married or 
unmarried couples in a high proportion, should maintain similar behavior in the 
US. Then, β1 should be positive. This is based on the idea that immigrants form 
their own attitudes based on perceptions of role models within their ethnic 
communities (Furtado et al. 2013), and also through family socialization (Bisin 
and Verdier 2000; Bisin et al. 2004). Parents may instill in their children beliefs 
and preferences about the predominant or customary way of living in their home 
                                                            
4 As in Furtado et al. (2013), we use a linear probability model for simplicity. Our conclusions are 
maintained applying a probit model; see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
5 We have repeated the whole analysis with/without those individuals reporting being married with 
their partner absent. Our results do not vary. All our robustness checks are available upon request. 
countries. The vector Xijk includes individual characteristics, such as gender, race, 
age, and education level. As Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) show, racial 
differences in marital status do exist (see also Brien 1997). Blacks normally enter 
into marriage later in life and even, sometimes, never marry. Since our sample 
includes individuals of different races, the coefficient picking up the impact of 
culture could be capturing racial differences, in addition to, or rather than, a 
cultural effect. To address this issue, we have incorporated three dummies to 
control for the race of the individuals (White, Black, and Asian).
6
 The inclusion of 
gender is also necessary because we choose those first-generation immigrants who 
are heads of household and, as the literature suggests, women who are more 
financially independent are more likely to divorce (Jalovaara 2003; Weiss and 
Willis 1997) and women who divorce are less likely to remarry (Buckle et al. 
1996; Gierveld 2004).
7
 Other research indicates that the age of the individuals and 
their level of education can have an effect on marital status for reasons 
independent of culture (Goldstein and Kenney 2001; Stevenson and Wolfers 
2007). As before, these factors must be incorporated in our specifications. 
Controls for unobserved characteristics of the areas where our first-generation 
immigrants live are added by using state fixed effects, denoted by     and for the 
country of origin unobserved characteristics, by introducing country of origin 
fixed effects,   .8 Standard errors are clustered at the home country level, in order 
to account for any within-ethnicity correlation in the error terms.
9
 
We have extended our work by using alternative methodologies in order to 
explore the choice of living with a partner of the same ethnicity, or not. This is 
explained in detail in Section 4. 
 
                                                            
6 The omitted race is other races. Those with more than one race have been eliminated from the 
analysis. The entire analysis has been re-estimated with/without race controls and results do not 
vary. We have also considered a sample of White individuals and our findings are unchanged, 
reinforcing that it is the cultural effect that we are observing. 
7 The IPUMS USA and the IPUMS International define the head of household as any household 
member in whose name the property is owned or rented. 
8 The inclusion of the country of origin fixed effects is not possible in all specifications (see 
below). We have re-run the analysis replacing the state fixed effects with Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA) fixed effects, and we do not find substantial differences. Results do not change 
including/excluding the country of origin fixed effects. 
9 All estimates have been repeated with/without weights and with/without clusters and we do not 
find differences. 
3. DATA 
In our main analysis, we use data from the 5% Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Sample (IPUMS) of the 2000 US census (Ruggles et al. 2015).
10
 Our sample 
consists of first-generation immigrants, who arrived in the US when they were 5 
years old or younger and whose country of origin is reported.
11
 These immigrants 
all grew up under US laws, institutions, and markets, but their attitudes are likely 
to reflect the attitudes of their parents and ethnic communities. We include 
individuals aged 25 to 64 because everyone in this sample can legally live with a 
partner. They have probably completed schooling and are below the retirement 
age. The 2000 US Census data allows us to identify unmarried couples, legally-
married couples, and those not living with a partner.
12 We select those immigrants 
who are heads of household or householders in order not to inflate the number of 
marriages/unmarried couples by including just one observation per household and 
not two observations (one for each member of the couple, which would be 
equivalent to considering two different marriages.
13
 We revisit this issue below. 
Our main sample contains 22,941 observations of heads of household who are 
first-generation immigrants, originating from 34 different countries.
 14
 
We cannot use a sample of second-generation immigrants, as other papers 
do, because there is no information on parents’ birth place in the 2000 US Census. 
Nonetheless, our sample of young arrivals can be considered quite similar to a 
sample of second-generation immigrants. In both cases, those individuals (young-
arrival first-generation immigrants and second-generation immigrants) have been 
exposed to US markets and institutions almost their entire lives. They are unlikely 
to suffer language barriers or the immigration shock (Fernández 2007; Fernández 
and Fogli 2006, 2009; Furtado et al. 2013; Giuliano 2007; Marcén et al. 2016). 
                                                            
10 As mentioned above, with that dataset, we have enough observations for 34 countries of origin, 
which allows us to obtain reliable results with all our sample selection requirements. 
11 Countries of origin with less than 20 observations per country have been removed from our 
analysis, following the recommendation of prior literature, since with only a few observations it is 
hard to assume that the immigrants represent the population composition of their country of origin. 
12 We only include heterosexual couples since same-sex couples were not allowed to marry in all 
countries during the period considered. There are only 16 heads of household that can be classified 
as having a same-sex partner. 
13  Among those household-head first-generation immigrants, we include those living in an 
identifiable statistical metropolitan area in order to maintain the same sample as in the cultural 
transmission analysis (see below). 
14 We use all the observations from countries where we have information on the cultural proxy in 
the IPUMS International. We include those immigrants originating from countries of origin where 
married and unmarried couples are identified in the Census data. 
Then, as Furtado et al. (2013) indicate, a sample of young-arrival first-generation 
immigrants can be useful in examining whether a cultural effect exists. It is true 
that there are other US Censuses containing information on second-generation 
immigrants, but the last one of those was the 1970 US Census. Because marriage 
patterns have changed in recent decades (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001; 
Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), we prefer to use more recent data. 
The cultural proxy is measured as the home-country proportion of 
individuals living with their partners, utilizing data from the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series International (IPUMS International).
 15
 To calculate this 
variable, we have chosen country-of-origin Censuses as close as possible to the 
year 2000 (see Table A2 in the Appendix). In this setting, it is assumed that the 
behavior of those immigrants who respond to the 2000 US Census is similar to the 
behavior of their counterparts in their country of origin in that same period of 
time.
16
 The IPUMS International allows us to construct the cultural variable by 
age and education level. This is important, since most of the conclusions of prior 
studies on the effects of culture are based on the assumption that culture does not 
differ within each country of origin, which generates some concerns on the 
validity of the results. The composition of immigrants living in the US can be 
different from that of the individuals living in their country of origin. For example, 
immigrants living in the US can be younger and more educated than the 
individuals living in their country of origin. Then, their behavior can vary from 
that captured by the cultural proxy. In addition, if the attitudes toward living 
together also change by age group and education, the use of just one measure of 
culture by country does not take into account that heterogeneity. To tackle these 
potential problems, we follow the proposal of Marcén et al. (2016) and calculate 
the cultural proxy by country of origin, age, and education level. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables by country of 
origin. The first column shows large variations in the proportion of immigrants 
living together across home countries: from around 50 % in Haiti and Jamaica, to 
83% in Romania. Since all those immigrants live under the same laws, 
institutions, and economic conditions, these large differences may indicate the 
                                                            
15 As before, this has been calculated using a sample of heads of household aged 25 to 64. 
16 This strategy is followed in the rest of the literature. It is worth noting that, as Fernández (2007) 
explains, culture adjusts very slowly and our results do not vary when we measure the cultural 
proxy in different years. 
presence of different social norms regarding how individuals should live, with or 
without a partner. By looking at the home-country proportion of individuals living 
together in each country of origin, column 2, we cannot deduce a clear 
relationship between the behavior of the immigrants and that of their counterparts. 
Although, for example, the lowest proportion of immigrants living with a partner 
originate from Jamaica, and the country of origin with the lowest proportion of 
individuals living together (as married or unmarried couples) is also Jamaica, for 
other countries this is not so clear. The raw data also reveals dissimilarities across 
countries in the gender composition, level of education, and age of the 
immigrants; 69% of immigrants are men, with this varying from just 48% in the 
case of immigrants from the Dominican Republic, to 90% in the case of those 
reporting a Romanian origin. The age of the immigrants in our sample is around 
39 years old, on average, with the youngest originating from El Salvador, at 33 
years old, and the oldest from Austria, at 49 years old, on average. Overall, 31% 
of the immigrants have completed high school, with the lowest percentage being 
from Bolivia (7%), and the highest from Mexico and Portugal (more than 41%). 
Regarding those who have completed at least a college degree, the lowest 
percentages are observed among those originating from Mexico (34%), and the 
highest among those from Bolivia (86%). Fewer differences are observed in terms 
of race: 75% of the immigrants are white, with the immigrants originating from 5 
of the 34 countries being predominantly non-white. Since there are differences 
across countries for all these variables, we consider that their incorporation in our 
analysis is necessary.  
Attitudes to the living-together decision can vary within each home country 
and across age groups. For example, in some countries, individuals who decide to 
live with a partner when they are young can be stigmatized, whereas, in other 
countries, living together when individuals are young may be socially accepted. If 
this is transmitted to the behavior of our sample of immigrants, the incorporation 
of more controls cannot help us to take into account the cultural differences within 
each country. We propose a more precise measure of culture, redefining the 
cultural proxy by country of origin and age group. The home-country proportion 
of individuals living together by country of origin and age interval is reported in 
table 2, where four age intervals are considered: 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54 and 
55 to 64. The differences across countries and age intervals are not limited to 
developing countries but, as Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) indicate, family ways 
of life vary widely across developed countries. Among those aged 25 to 34, 77% 
live with a partner, ranging from a low of 21% for Jamaica, to a high of 96% for 
Iran. In the case of Jamaica, the minimum proportion of individuals living 
together corresponds to that age group (25-34); however, in the case of Iran, the 
maximum proportion of individuals living with a partner is achieved by the 
youngest age group. This pattern of behavior is not limited to those countries 
alone. Among the 23 countries having more than 70% of individuals living with a 
partner in the first age interval (25-34), 14 achieve their maximum at that age 
group, and the rest (9) in the second age interval (35-44). However, all but 4 of the 
countries with less than 70% of individuals living together in the first age group 
achieve their maximum when they are aged 45 to 54. In the latest age interval (55-
64), the lowest proportions are for those residing in Jamaica (less than 46%) and 
the highest for Iran (more than 83%). We recognize that, although those two 
countries (Jamaica and Iran) are the same as those observed in the first age group, 
the rest of the countries do not behave in a similar way. There are countries with 
low proportions of individuals living with a partner in the first age group but 
having a high proportion of individuals in the latest age group (see the case of the 
Netherlands). 
Is that pattern of behavior mimicked by the immigrants living in the US? 
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between the proportion of immigrants living 
with their partners in the US, and the home-country proportion of individuals 
living with their partners by country of origin and age interval. We have only 
included 2 age intervals (the first and the last: 25-34 and 55-64) as an example. 
For those aged 25-34, there is a positive relationship between the two variables: 
the higher the home-country proportion of individuals living with their partner, the 
greater the proportion of immigrants (aged 25-34) living with their partners in the 
US. This is not so clear for the last age group, which may indicate that the cultural 
differences within the countries of origin may also be consequence of other 
characteristics of the individuals.  
Social norms can differ depending on education level. It may be more 
socially acceptable for an individual to live without a partner if she/he is more 
educated, but it can be less acceptable for an individual with a low education 
level. This can also vary by age group. Then, as before, to address this issue, we 
measure the cultural proxy by country of origin, education level, and age group, 
with the education groups being: not completed high school, completed high 
school, some college (1 to 3 years of degree studies), and more college (4 and 
more years of degree studies).
17
 The culture of each country of origin includes 16 
different measures. In the next section, we show whether the redefinition of the 
cultural proxy is useful to better determine whether culture does, in fact, play a 
role in the decision to live with a partner. 
4. RESULTS 
a. Baseline Model 
Table 3 presents the estimates for our main specification. As can be seen in 
column 1, our results are consistent with the literature. Men are more likely to 
report living together (married or unmarried), since, for example, they are more 
likely to remarry when they divorce (Furtado et al. 2013).
18
 Also, as prior studies 
suggest, black individuals are much more likely to live without a partner than 
individuals of other races (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). The impact of age has an 
inverted U-shape, achieving the maximum at 40 years old, which is line with the 
literature suggesting that older individuals are more likely to be divorced, and so, 
to live without a partner (Furtado et al. 2013). Higher levels of education are 
related to lower probabilities of marriage or living together as married, although in 
the case of the college-educated with 4 or more years of degree studies, this is not 
so clear in all specifications. This could be due to the fact that the level of 
education is a potential factor in the choice of a different ethnic partner (Stevenson 
and Wolfers 2007), which can affect the probability of couple dissolution. We 
revisit the choice of a same or different ethnic partner in subsection 4.c.  
With respect to our variable of interest, the estimated coefficient on the 
cultural proxy (HCLT) indicates that a higher proportion of individuals living 
together as married or unmarried couples in an immigrant’s country of origin is 
associated with an increase in the probability that that immigrant reports living 
with a partner (see column 1). Taking the epidemiological approach, this empirical 
                                                            
17 For those countries that do not distinguish between some college and more college, we have 
measured the cultural proxy for the tertiary level of education. Results are maintained without the 
immigrants originating from those particular countries of origin. 
18 Note that our sample only incorporates heads of household. The analysis by gender is described 
below. 
evidence can be interpreted as a cultural effect. We must clarify that the cultural 
proxy is defined as the home-country proportion of individuals living together (as 
married or unmarried couples) in column 1. In that specification, there is only one 
measure of culture for each country of origin, which is the common strategy in the 
research of the impact of culture. Nevertheless, as we have explained above, with 
this approach we are not taking into consideration the possible cultural differences 
within each home country, which is also a common problem in the literature on 
cultural issues. Since the preferences and beliefs of individuals can vary 
depending on their age and education level, and this can also vary across 
countries, we have re-estimated the equation (1), by redefining the cultural proxy 
by age interval and country of origin, and by measuring the cultural proxy by age, 
education level, and country of origin. In this setting, there are 4 and 16 different 
measures of the culture for each home country, respectively. Estimates can be 
found in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3. In both cases, the redefinition of the cultural 
proxy in several categories for each country of origin permits us to include 
country of origin fixed effects in order to pick up the unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries. As in column 1, we detect a positive relationship between the 
home-country proportion of individuals living together (regardless of the 
categories included in the cultural proxy) and the probability that an immigrant 
lives with a partner in the US. The estimated coefficient is considerably greater 
(28%) in column 3 than in the other two columns, even after including the country 
of origin fixed effects, which suggests that we are measuring the cultural impact 
more precisely after considering the cultural differences within countries by age 
and education level. 
19
 
Our findings point to culture being an important factor. We find that when 
the cultural proxy (HCLT) increases by 1 percentage point, there is a rise of 
around 0.17 percentage points in the probability that an immigrant reports living 
with a partner in the US. Therefore, because of the cultural effect, immigrants 
from the country with the highest HCLT, Iran, are about 10.2 percentage points 
more likely to be living with a partner in the US than immigrants from Jamaica, 
                                                            
19 The rest of the regressions displayed in the paper only include the cultural proxy measured by 
age, education level, and country of origin, since this variable allows us to better capture the 
culture of each country of origin. For consistency, we have repeated the analysis with the previous 
measures of culture and our conclusions on the impact of culture are maintained, although there are 
variations in the magnitude of the effect. 
the country of origin with the lowest HCLT. Adding Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) fixed effects rather than state fixed effects does not alter our 
conclusions (see column 4).
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Given that the sample selection of immigrants only includes heads of 
household, we have also explored the possibility that gender issues could be 
driving our results. Householders have traditionally been men, normally the 
breadwinners in many traditional societies. If that traditional behavior, in which 
women form their identities based on wife and mother gender roles, and men on 
worker and breadwinner gender roles (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), is transmitted 
to the sample of immigrants, we would expect to observe a greater impact of 
culture on the male sample than on the female sample of householders, simply 
because women householders are less likely to follow the traditional social norms. 
To examine this issue, we have divided the sample by gender. Results are shown 
in columns 5 and 6 for men and women, respectively. The estimated points 
indicate that an increase in the home-country proportion of individuals living 
together increases the probability of living together for immigrants (men and 
women, separately) of those countries of origin. The magnitude of the coefficient 
is almost 19% greater in the case of the male sample than in the female sample, in 
line with our predictions. What is remarkable in this analysis is that even with a 
sample of less-traditional individuals (the sample of women householders) with 
respect to gender issues, we still observe that culture matters for the decision to 
live with a partner.
21
 Our results do not appear to depend on gender differences. 
For further evidence that our results are not affected by the heterogeneity 
across countries, we have repeated the analysis by including controls for 
observable characteristics of the countries of origin. We include the total fertility 
rate, the unemployment rate, GDP per capita (in constant 2010 $US), the crude 
marriage rate, and a dummy variable for whether the predominant religion in a 
country of origin is Catholicism.
22
 We do not have information on all of these 
                                                            
20 IPUMS USA defines a metropolitan area as a region formed by neighboring communities that 
have a high degree of economic and social integration with the urban core. The population 
threshold to identify an MSA is 100,000 inhabitants. 
21 It is surprising that, for the female sample, the coefficients picking up the effects of race and the 
cultural proxy are statistically significant, but not the rest of the controls (age, education level; see 
column 6). This should be taken with caution because of the small number of observations that we 
have for several countries of origin of the female sample. 
22The total fertility rate is defined as the mean number of children that would be born alive to a 
woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the 
controls for the entire sample of countries of origin. We lose almost two thousand 
observations. Results are the same when we run the analysis with that reduced 
sample (see column 1 of Table 4). Cross-country differences in fertility behavior 
may be driving the marital decisions if, for example, those countries with greater 
preferences for having children (with high fertility rates) are also more likely to 
have their children when the parents are living together (as married or unmarried 
couples) influencing the marital decision. Similarly, dissimilarities in economic 
conditions (unemployment and GDP) across countries may have a different 
impact on marital behavior if, for example, those countries with worse economic 
conditions also have a greater necessity for more traditional families where a 
single mother has more difficulty living without a partner. The crude marriage rate 
can be considered as an alternative measure of culture with respect to the 
immigrants’ decision to marry. Unfortunately, it is not useful for capturing the 
decision of living together as an unmarried couple. Then, we have incorporated 
that rate to the analysis in order to show that cross-country variations in the crude 
marriage rate have no effect on our estimates. To check whether our estimates are, 
in fact, capturing the effect of culture rather than religion differences, we have 
also added a control for whether the country of origin has Catholicism as the 
predominant religion. As explained in Furtado et al. (2013), those living in 
Catholic countries tend to be less likely to divorce, and so, more likely to live with 
a partner, since that religion usually stigmatizes divorced individuals. For 
instance, those who divorce are not permitted to remarry under that religion. 
Results are reported in Table 4. As shown in the second column, the estimated 
coefficient capturing the effect of culture is positive and statistically significant, 
providing additional evidence that we are capturing the effect of culture, rather 
than heterogeneity across countries.
23
 We also run some simple robustness checks, 
including and excluding those countries with the highest number of observations 
and with the highest and lowest HCLT. In the third column, we drop Mexicans 
                                                                                                                                                                   
fertility rates by age of a given year. Unemployment rate is the percentage of the total labor force, 
that is without work but available for and seeking employment. GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by mid-year population. Crude marriage rates are the annual number of marriages 
per 1000 mid-year population. Data are collected for the year 2000 (or for the closer year if no data 
is available for that year) and come from the World Bank Data and from the UN Demographic 
Yearbooks. The information to elaborate the Catholic dummy variable came from The World Fact 
Book of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
23 We re-run the analysis including each of this observable characteristics at a time and our results 
do not change. 
from our sample of first-generation immigrants, because they are the largest 
immigrant group. The fourth column reports the estimations without the first-
generation immigrants from Germany, which is the country of origin with the 
oldest Census from the IPUMS International, in addition to being the country of 
origin of the second largest immigrant group. Immigrants originating from both 
Mexico and Germany have been eliminated in column 5. In column 6, we repeat 
the analysis without those from Jamaica, which presents the lowest HCLT, and 
without those from Iran, having the highest HCLT. Our findings do not vary. All 
the results described in this subsection suggest that culture plays an important role 
in the living-together decision. 
b. The effect of culture on married and unmarried couples  
Up to now, we have focused on the decision to live together as married or 
unmarried couples. Nevertheless, during recent decades, there have been changes 
in the demographics of marriage in many countries. As is shown in Figure 3, the 
crude marriage rate has decreased, especially since the early 1990s. That rate has 
been calculated for all countries, with the information available in the UN 
Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). The age at first marriage has also 
increased and more couples choose to cohabit rather than to marry (Bumpass and 
Lu 2000; Cherlin 2002; Manning et al. 2014). For individuals aged 20 to 30, this 
is more remarkable since the proportion of married individuals is almost the same 
as those who live with a partner as unmarried couple in 2011 (see Figure 4; data 
from the IPUMS International). At least in part, the different behavior of young 
individuals is being taken into consideration in our analysis defining the cultural 
variable by age group. However, it can be surmised that, since cohabitation is 
considered as an alternative to singlehood, rather than as an alternative to marriage 
in certain countries (Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel, 1990), our estimates may be 
capturing the cross-country differences in traditional laws regarding marriage, 
rather than the effect of culture on the living-together decision. For example, it is 
possible to argue that those countries having a high proportion of individuals 
living together are also those having more traditional social norms concerning 
marriage, and those countries having a low proportion of individuals living 
together are those where unmarried couples and the decision to remain single is 
more widely accepted. To tackle this issue, we have re-run the entire analysis, 
separating the sample between married and unmarried individuals.  
Table 5 reports our results. The cultural proxy is defined as the home-
country proportion of individuals who report being married, by age and education 
level, in column 1, and where unmarried individuals have been excluded from our 
sample. Our variable of interest is calculated as the proportion of individuals who 
report living as an unmarried couple by age and education level, in the second 
column, where the married individuals are not included. The estimated 
coefficients on the cultural effect are in both columns positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that culture plays a role. These results reinforce our 
previous findings, since it appears that the behavior of married or unmarried 
couples, separately, are not driving our results. In any case, we recognize that the 
estimates of the effect of culture on unmarried couples should be taken with 
caution, since the number of unmarried couples is quite low in several countries of 
the IPUMS International.  
c. The effect of culture on same or different origin couples 
In the previous analysis, we have only considered the country of origin of our 
householder first-generation immigrants as the indicator of culture. The decision 
to live with a partner is attributed to the preference of one of the members of the 
couple (the householder) and not to the beliefs and preferences of the other 
member, which may also be a determinant. In these circumstances, rather than 
having two alternatives: living together or not, immigrants have three possibilities: 
they can live without a partner, live with a partner of the same origin, or live with 
a partner of different origin. This is important for our analysis since, if culture 
matters, the impact of the cultural proxy (HCLT) should be lower in different-
origin couples than in same-origin couples. In fact, ethnic intermarriage is seen as 
the “final step” in the immigrant culture assimilation process (Gordon 1964). To 
check this, we propose the use of a model for nominal outcomes, specifically a 
Multinominal Logit Model (MNL) in which we calculate a separate binary logit 
for each pair of outcome categories (Nervole and Press 1973). Formally, we 
estimate the following equation: 
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In Equation (2), b is the base category and m varies from 1 to J, with J being 
the total number of outcome categories, in our case, three (living without a 
partner, living with a partner of the same origin, or living with a partner of 
different origin). The vector x includes all the variables defined in equation (1). 
Results are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. In order to analyze the 
dynamics among the outcome categories, we prefer the use of odds ratios, which 
is an intuitive method of interpreting the estimates (Greene 2008; Long and Freese 
2006). Holding other variables constant, the changed factor in the odds of 
outcome category m versus outcome category n, when 
ix  increased by  , equals: 
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For a unit change in 
ix , 1 , the odds of m versus n are expected to 
change by a factor of )exp(
, nmi
 , holding all other variables constant. For a 
standard deviation change in ix , ,ixs the odds of m versus n are expected to 
change by a factor of )exp(
, ixnmi
s . To simplify the odds analysis, the odds 
ratios can be presented in an odds-ratio plot (Long and Freese 2006). Figure 5 
shows the odds ratios for the estimates presented in Table 5. The independent 
variables are represented in separate rows. The horizontal axis indicates the 
relative magnitude of the coefficients associated with each outcome category. The 
numbers correspond to the outcome categories: "1" denotes living without a 
partner, which is the base category in that figure, "2" living with a partner of the 
same origin, and "3" living with a partner of different origin. The distance 
between a given pair of outcome categories indicates the magnitude of the effect, 
and the statistical significance is shown by drawing a line between categories for 
which there is no statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level of 
significance. Results suggest that the cultural proxy is important in the choice of 
the living status of immigrants. In the case of the HCLT, categories 2 and 3 are to 
the right of category 1, then the greater the home-country proportion of 
individuals living together in an immigrant’s country of origin, the more likely it 
is that that immigrant choice is living with a partner of the same (outcome 
category 2) or of different origin (outcome category 3).
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 Also, the greater the 
HCLT, the more likely are individuals to choose living with a partner of the same 
ethnicity since outcome category 2 is to the right of outcome category 3. Those are 
interesting results because, in the literature, papers can be found that use ethnic 
intermarriage as a measure of intergenerational assimilation rates of immigrants, 
(Card et al. 2000; Furtado 2015): the greater the extent of ethnic intermarriage, the 
greater the scope of the intergenerational assimilation process. However, we 
cannot dismiss the possibility that parents, or the ethnic communities where 
immigrants live, instill in those immigrants the preferences for not living with a 
partner. Then, ethnic intermarriage may not well capture the intergenerational 
assimilation process, or even the social distance between ethnic groups. Another 
noticeable result that the odds-ratio plot reveals is that of the education controls. It 
is observed that the higher the level of education the more likely are individuals to 
choose living with a partner of a different country of origin, then the category 
chosen is not living with a partner, and the less likely category is living with a 
partner of the same country of origin. More educated individuals may be better 
able to adapt to different cultures, making them more likely to live with a partner 
outside of their ethnicity (Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2011). In addition, the 
more educated are less likely to reside in ethnic enclaves, which makes it difficult 
to find potential spouses of the same ethnicity (Furtado and Theodoropoulos 
2011). This can explain the results for the education variables presented in the 
paper. All the empirical evidence presented here provides additional evidence of 
the existence of a cultural effect. 
d. Cultural Transmission 
To provide supplemental evidence that we are capturing the effect of culture, the 
exploration of the possible transmission of culture can be useful. It can be 
suggested that culture has no effect on the decisions of couples, because 
immigrants simply reproduce their own parents behavior, living together if they 
live with a partner, and not living together if their parents do not do that. To 
address this point, we would have liked to control for whether the immigrant’s 
parents were living together, but this information is not available in the Census 
                                                            
24 As before, the cultural proxy is measured in this case by age, education level, and country of 
origin. 
data. We can analyze whether culture has been transmitted horizontally, through 
neighbors, friends, or the ethnic communities in which immigrants live, but not 
the vertical transmission of culture; that is, the transmission of culture through 
parents (grandparents or other ancestors). Local communities can sustain culture 
either by providing role models for acceptable family actions, or by punishing 
conduct different from the norm (Fernández and Fogli 2009). In this framework, 
we can study whether immigrants are sensitive to the ethnic communities. As 
Furtado et al. (2013) suggest, the stronger relationship between the cultural proxy 
and the decision of living together in predominantly same-ethnic communities 
may be interpreted as empirical evidence that culture is horizontally transmitted. 
To explore this issue, following Bertrand et al. (2010), we consider the possible 
existence of network effects with the following model: 
 
                                                    
 
where     is the proportion of immigrants from the same country of origin j in 
each metropolitan area k,    represents the country of origin fixed effects, and      
is the error term. The remaining variables have been defined above. The country 
of origin fixed effects capture any unobservable determinant of couple’s behavior 
that varies by home country. Our variable of interest is the interaction between 
ethnic concentration and the home-country proportion of immigrants living with a 
partner (as married or unmarried couples). If there is a horizontal transmission of 
culture, an increase in the concentration of same-ethnicity individuals should 
increase the probability of living with a married or unmarried partner, more for 
immigrants originating from countries with a high proportion of couples living 
together than for those from countries with a low proportion of couples living 
together. Then, we would expect β2 to be positive. 
Table 6 presents our results. As seen in the first column, the coefficient 
capturing the effect of ethnic concentration is not statistically significant (see 
column 1). The same occurs after adding the cultural proxy in column 2. The 
estimated coefficient on the HCLT remains similar. It is positive and statistically 
significant in column 2. The interaction between both variables (the ethnic 
concentration and the HCLT) is introduced in column 3. In that case, the 
coefficient on the ethnic concentration is negative and statistically significant, and 
the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, which may indicate 
that, depending on the HCLT level, the effect of the ethnic concentration varies 
from positive to negative. To easily interpret this, we focus on column 4. The 
results indicate that an increase of 10 percentage points in the concentration of 
immigrants from Jamaica leads to a decrease of 0.18 in the probability of living 
with a partner (married or unmarried) for Jamaicans in the US (the home-country 
proportion of couples living together in Jamaica is 0.34). However, the same 10 
percentage-point increase in the concentration of Iranians results in a 0.07 increase 
in the probability of living with a married or unmarried partner for Iranian 
immigrants (the home-country proportion of couples living together in Iran is 
0.93). According to this finding, only for those immigrants originating from 
countries where the proportion of couples living together is greater than 0.76, it is 
found that an increase in the concentration of individuals of the same ethnic 
community appears to increase the probability of living with a partner (married or 
unmarried). In addition, the higher the home-country proportion, the greater is the 
increase. For the rest, an increase in the concentration of individuals of the same 
ethnic community appears to decrease the probability of living with a partner 
(married or unmarried). Then, these results appear to suggest the existence of a 
horizontal transmission of culture. We observe that, for high levels of HCLT, 
immigrants are sensitive to the behavior of their ethnic communities, increasing 
the probability of living with a partner. However, for low levels of HCLT, the 
concentration of same-ethnic individuals clearly discourage immigrants from 
choosing to live with a partner. Certainly, we are not claiming that this is a full-
proof method of identifying the transmission of culture but, as all the remaining 
results in this paper, our findings suggest that, not only do laws and institutions 
affect immigrant's decisions about living with a partner, but that culture may also 
play a role. 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
Why is the decision to live together as married or unmarried of such concern? In 
the literature, economists, sociologists, and other researchers have given many 
alternative responses to that question, primarily focusing on reproductive reasons 
(having children), on children’s outcomes, legal issues, and on economic 
incentives. Although these various responses are common in the majority of the 
countries, there are still considerable differences across countries in the number of 
individuals who decide to live with a partner. In addition, living together is not 
always the best option, since in some cases men - and especially women - are 
trapped in problematic and even violent relationships (Lehrer and Son 2017). 
Then, we wonder why the numbers of individuals living together vary so much 
from one country to another. In our work, we show that social norms (culture) 
may be an important factor in the decision to live together as a married or 
unmarried couple. 
To isolate the effects of culture from those of markets and institutions in 
determining the individuals’ decisions about living with a partner (as married or 
unmarried), we have followed an epidemiological approach (Fernández 2007). We 
have based our work on US data on young-arrival immigrants who subsequently 
grew up under the same laws and institutions. Since immigrants’ attitudes are 
probably similar to the preferences of their parents, forebears and ethnic 
communities, we use dissimilarities in the proportion of couples living together by 
country of origin to document the extent of the impact of culture.  
Results show a positive and statistically significant effect of our proxy of 
culture on the likelihood that an immigrant chooses to live with a partner (married 
or unmarried). We see our findings as evidence that cross-country variations in 
laws and institutions cannot entirely explain the observed variations in the 
proportion of immigrants living with their partners in the US. This is in line with 
the work of Furtado et al. (2013), who finds that culture also appears to be a 
determinant in divorce decisions. Our estimates are robust to controls for 
observable and unobservable characteristics by country of origin, to the use of 
different subsamples, and to the redefinition of the cultural proxy. Empirical 
evidence also suggests that differences in attitudes regarding unmarried 
cohabitation do not drive our results. Separately, culture affects both married and 
unmarried cohabitation.  
The exploration of the formation of same- or different-origin couples 
provides supplemental empirical evidence in favor of the effect of culture on the 
living-together decision. Clearly, it is observed that the greater the home-country 
proportion of individuals living together, the more likely are those immigrants 
originating from that country of origin to choose living together as married or 
unmarried couples, regardless of their partners’ ethnicity. It is worth noting that 
the choice of a partner of the same ethnicity is the more likely option for those 
originating from countries with a high proportion of individuals living together. 
This is interesting for the literature that uses ethnic intermarriage as a measure of 
intergenerational assimilation rates of immigrants, (Card et al. 2000; Furtado 
2015) since our estimates suggest that parents preferences relative to the choice of 
living without a partner can also be transmitted to their children, which in turn 
raises doubts about the utilization of ethnic intermarriage as a proxy of 
intergenerational assimilation. 
The ways in which culture is transmitted has also been explored. We 
provide additional evidence to reinforce the notion that our estimates are capturing 
the effects of culture. Because of data restrictions, we can only examine the 
horizontal transmission of culture. Results appear to reveal a marked sensitivity of 
immigrants to the behavior of their communities, and in this way, our findings 
provide evidence that culture plays an important role in couples’ decisions. Of 
course, one interesting issue for further research is an exploration of the 
mechanisms through which culture may be operating. 
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Figure 1: The proportion of immigrants living with a partner in the US, and the 
proportion of individuals living with a partner in their respective countries of 
origin. All aged 25 to 34. 
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Notes: The home-country proportion of individuals living with a partner (married or unmarried), 
calculated using data from the IPUMS International, is plotted on the x-axis, while the 
proportion of immigrants living with a partner of those countries of origin, calculated using data 
from the 5% IPUMS of the 2000 US census, is plotted on the y-axis. In both cases, individuals 
aged 25 to 34 are considered. 
 Figure 2: The proportion of immigrants living with a partner and the proportion 
of individuals living with a partner in their respective countries of origin: All aged 
55 to 64. 
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Notes: The home-country proportion of individuals living with a partner (married or unmarried), 
calculated using data from the IPUMS International, is plotted on the x-axis, while the 
proportion of immigrants living with a partner of those countries of origin, calculated using data 
from the 5% IPUMS of the 2000 US census, is plotted on the y-axis. In both cases, individuals 
aged 55 to 64 are considered. 
 Figure 3: Evolution of the crude marriage rate from 1980 to 2014. 
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Notes: Data come from the UN Demographic Yearbooks (several issues). The crude marriage 
rate represented in this figure has been calculated using information on all countries with 
available data for the period considered. 
Figure 4: Evolution of married and unmarried couples from 1970 to 2011: 
individuals aged 20 to 30. 
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Notes: Data come from the IPUMS International. 
Figure 5: Remain single (outcome 1), live with a same-origin partner 
(outcome 2), or live with a different-origin partner (outcome 3): using a 
Multinomial Logit . 
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Notes: Robust standard errors. With respect to the sample, see notes to Table 3. The numbers 
correspond to the outcome categories: 1 indicates not living with a partner, 2 indicates living 
with a partner of the same country of origin, and 3 indicates living with a partner not having the 
same country of origin. The additive scale on the bottom axis measures the value of βi,m|n δ. 
The multiplicative scale on the top axis measures exp(βi,m|n)δ. The statistical significance is 
shown by drawing a line between categories for which there is no significant coefficient at the 
5% level. 
Table 1: Summary statistics by country of origin 
Country of origin 
Proportion 
of 
immigrants 
living 
together 
Home-
country 
cultural 
proxy 
Man White Black Age 
High school 
graduate 
Some 
college 
More 
college 
Observations 
Argentina 0.7 0.6 0.73 0.9 0.01 38.16 0.24 0.25 0.48 179 
Austria 0.67 0.58 0.73 0.99 0 48.91 0.27 0.22 0.48 279 
Bolivia 0.72 0.77 0.62 0.72 0 38.66 0.07 0.41 0.45 29 
Brazil 0.59 0.75 0.59 0.87 0.02 37.86 0.21 0.23 0.5 145 
Chile 0.64 0.73 0.64 0.84 0 37.79 0.13 0.29 0.57 75 
Colombia 0.64 0.7 0.74 0.69 0.01 36.46 0.25 0.28 0.41 320 
Costa Rica 0.62 0.78 0.57 0.66 0.03 37.16 0.24 0.34 0.42 76 
Cuba 0.68 0.69 0.7 0.91 0.02 38.93 0.27 0.32 0.37 1,390 
Dominican Republic 0.56 0.72 0.48 0.29 0.12 36.54 0.33 0.27 0.26 283 
Ecuador 0.67 0.8 0.68 0.6 0.01 36.94 0.22 0.38 0.37 149 
El Salvador 0.64 0.72 0.65 0.36 0.01 33.43 0.38 0.2 0.22 158 
Ethiopia 0.52 0.81 0.65 0.65 0.35 34 0.26 0.23 0.52 31 
France 0.63 0.57 0.69 0.93 0.06 41.53 0.26 0.26 0.45 810 
Germany 0.64 0.76 0.7 0.93 0.05 40.66 0.28 0.28 0.41 6,385 
Greece 0.65 0.75 0.73 0.98 0.01 40.32 0.2 0.28 0.47 281 
Haiti 0.5 0.79 0.52 0.07 0.89 35.83 0.2 0.29 0.44 109 
Hungary 0.59 0.61 0.73 0.99 0 47.39 0.32 0.21 0.46 112 
Iran 0.54 0.93 0.67 0.97 0.01 36.62 0.16 0.19 0.66 122 
Ireland 0.58 0.61 0.67 0.99 0.01 42.43 0.32 0.29 0.38 168 
Italy 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.98 0.01 41.66 0.35 0.24 0.37 1,149 
Jamaica 0.51 0.34 0.57 0.1 0.88 35.1 0.28 0.3 0.4 249 
Jordan 0.81 0.91 0.81 1 0 38.77 0.35 0.35 0.26 31 
Mexico 0.72 0.82 0.71 0.43 0 35.88 0.41 0.22 0.12 5,217 
Morocco 0.68 0.84 0.68 0.97 0.01 40.63 0.24 0.28 0.46 97 
Netherlands 0.71 0.68 0.73 0.92 0.01 44.08 0.3 0.28 0.4 306 
Nicaragua 0.65 0.76 0.65 0.51 0 36.49 0.37 0.32 0.21 71 
Panama 0.6 0.73 0.62 0.75 0.17 41.34 0.26 0.32 0.42 395 
Peru 0.59 0.79 0.71 0.64 0.01 37.85 0.19 0.3 0.46 139 
Philippines 0.63 0.87 0.69 0.22 0.03 35.97 0.17 0.31 0.5 1,000 
Portugal 0.74 0.81 0.74 0.99 0.01 36.49 0.41 0.24 0.18 296 
Romania 0.83 0.71 0.9 0.98 0 40.76 0.37 0.22 0.37 41 
Spain 0.61 0.73 0.64 0.91 0.03 34.65 0.25 0.31 0.41 353 
United Kingdom 0.61 0.53 0.68 0.92 0.05 41.5 0.28 0.3 0.4 2,362 
Venezuela 0.66 0.72 0.66 0.93 0.01 39.99 0.21 0.21 0.56 134 
Average 0.66 0.73 0.69 0.75 0.05 39.09 0.31 0.27 0.34   
Std. Dev. 0.47 0.10 0.46 0.43 0.21 8.73 0.46 0.44 0.47   
Notes: Data from the 5% microdata sample of the 2000 US Census, IPUMS USA. The sample contains 22,941 observations of immigrants, aged 25 to 64, 
originating from 34 different countries. 
Table 2: Proportion of individuals living with a partner in each country 
of origin by age group. 
Country  25 to 34 
years old 
35 to 44 
years old 
45 to 54 
years old 
55 to 64 
years old 
Argentina 0.51 0.64 0.63 0.59 
Austria 0.41 0.61 0.66 0.65 
Bolivia 0.79 0.8 0.75 0.68 
Brazil 0.81 0.78 0.72 0.64 
Chile 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.64 
Colombia 0.74 0.74 0.68 0.63 
Costa Rica 0.84 0.8 0.75 0.68 
Cuba 0.76 0.73 0.66 0.6 
Dominican Republic 0.77 0.75 0.69 0.62 
Ecuador 0.84 0.82 0.77 0.71 
El Salvador 0.8 0.76 0.68 0.62 
Ethiopia 0.83 0.84 0.77 0.72 
France 0.38 0.59 0.67 0.67 
Germany 0.82 0.86 0.75 0.63 
Greece 0.64 0.79 0.8 0.75 
Haiti 0.76 0.83 0.8 0.74 
Hungary 0.57 0.65 0.62 0.59 
Iran 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.83 
Ireland 0.42 0.68 0.68 0.64 
Italy 0.62 0.75 0.77 0.72 
Jamaica 0.21 0.33 0.42 0.46 
Jordan 0.92 0.95 0.9 0.83 
Mexico 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.69 
Morocco 0.79 0.88 0.86 0.8 
Netherlands 0.47 0.71 0.77 0.78 
Nicaragua 0.86 0.78 0.7 0.62 
Panama 0.79 0.77 0.71 0.64 
Peru 0.82 0.82 0.78 0.73 
Philippines 0.92 0.91 0.84 0.74 
Portugal 0.8 0.85 0.82 0.77 
Romania 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.65 
Spain 0.62 0.76 0.77 0.75 
United Kingdom 0.24 0.5 0.62 0.61 
Venezuela 0.8 0.75 0.68 0.6 
Average 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.67 
Std. Dev. 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.05 
Notes: The home-country proportion of individuals living together by country 
of origin and age interval has been calculated using information from the 
International IPUMS. See Table A1 in the Appendix.   
Table 3: The effect of culture on the living-together decision 
Dependent Variable: Living 
together as married or unmarried 
couples 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Home-country proportion of  0.135*** 0.148** 0.173*** 0.181** 0.196** 0.165*** 
individuals living together (0.047) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.096) (0.042) 
Male 0.412*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.409*** 
  
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
  
White -0.041*** -0.016* -0.016* -0.019** -0.011 -0.025** 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Black -0.151*** -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.126*** -0.150*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) 
Asian -0.092*** -0.027 -0.025 -0.025 -0.052*** 0.025 
 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.052) 
Age 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.019*** -0.007 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age2/100 -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.020*** -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
High school graduate -0.049*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.021 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.027) 
Some college -0.062*** -0.043** -0.035* -0.032* -0.036* -0.033 
 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) 
More college -0.059*** -0.036 -0.028 -0.025 -0.045* 0.0004 
 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.028) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
MSA fixed effects No No No Yes No No 
Country of origin fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,941 22,941 22,941 22,941 15,887 7,054 
R2 0.175 0.179 0.179 0.189 0.033 0.042 
Notes: The home-country proportion of individuals living together as married and unmarried couples is 
calculated using information from the IPUMS International. The sample, obtained from the 5% microdata 
sample of the 2000 US Census, consists of immigrants aged 25 to 64 who arrived in the US at or before the age 
of 5 and who report a country of origin. In the first column, the home-country cultural proxy has been calculated 
by country of origin. The second column incorporates the cultural proxy measured by country of origin and age 
group (25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64). In the rest of columns, our variable of interest has been calculated by 
country of origin, age group, and education level. Column 5 only incorporates immigrant men, and column 6 
only incorporates immigrant women. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of 
origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 
10% level.  
Table 4: Robustness checks 
Dependent Variable: Living 
together as married or unmarried 
couples 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Home-country proportion of  0.129*** 0.191*** 0.145*** 0.178*** 0.136*** 0.205*** 
individuals living together (0.036) (0.023) (0.033) (0.028) (0.035) (0.033) 
Male 0.421*** 0.419*** 0.418*** 0.411*** 0.405*** 0.421*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) 
White -0.042*** -0.024*** -0.015 -0.024*** -0.023 -0.021*** 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.022) (0.006) 
Black -0.159*** -0.127*** -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.110*** -0.135*** 
 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.016) 
Asian -0.082** -0.062* -0.056 -0.059 -0.063 -0.052 
 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.044) (0.041) (0.053) (0.033) 
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.012** 0.007** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) 
Age2/100 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012** -0.013*** -0.015** -0.009*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
High school graduate -0.045*** -0.035*** -0.014 -0.041*** -0.032 -0.034*** 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.019) (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) 
Some college -0.053*** -0.039** -0.005 -0.048*** -0.021 -0.036* 
 
(0.012) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.024) (0.018) 
More college -0.050*** -0.034 0.003 -0.051*** -0.019 -0.030 
 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) 
Total fertility rate 
 
-0.004 -0.015 -0.007 -0.015 -0.011 
  
(0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP pc 
 
0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 
  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Crude marriage rate 
 
0.010 0.003 0.013 0.005 0.018*** 
  
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) 
Catholic population 
 
0.049*** 0.039*** 0.076* 0.055* 0.051*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.040) (0.028) (0.011) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,210 21,210 15,993 14,825 9,608 20,839 
R2 0.183 0.184 0.179 0.183 0.174 0.185 
Note: The home-country proportion of married and unmarried couples has been calculated by country of origin, age 
group, and education level in all estimations. We have excluded those immigrants originating from Mexico in the third 
column, those originating from Germany in the fourth column, and both have been excluded in column 5. Column 6 
excludes immigrants from Jamaica and Iran. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of 
origin, are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% 
level.  
Table 5: The effect of culture on married and unmarried couples, and on same- or 
different-ethnicity couples 
Dependent Variable: Married Unmarried 
Living 
together as 
same-origin 
couple 
Living together 
as different-
origin couple 
Home-country cultural proxy 0.148** 0.151** 2.156*** 0.689** 
 
(0.070) (0.058) (0.529) (0.297) 
Male 0.458*** 0.060*** 1.730*** 1.853*** 
 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.060) (0.071) 
White -0.012 -0.035*** -0.112** -0.054 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.049) (0.052) 
Black -0.121*** -0.085*** -0.668** -0.578*** 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.324) (0.089) 
Asian -0.032* -0.018 0.553 -0.257*** 
 
(0.017) (0.036) (0.501) (0.097) 
Age 0.016*** -0.015*** 0.072* 0.050*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.038) (0.014) 
Age2/100 -0.018*** 0.012*** -0.094* -0.062*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.051) (0.017) 
High school graduate -0.035*** -0.028** -0.478*** 0.071* 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.047) (0.040) 
Some college -0.037* -0.047*** -0.831*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.021) (0.012) (0.088) (0.042) 
More college -0.026 -0.060*** -0.983*** 0.182*** 
 
(0.024) (0.010) (0.104) (0.052) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,505 9,277 22,941 22,941 
R2 0.214 0.049     
Note: The home-country has been calculated by country of origin, age group, education level in all 
estimations. In columns 1 and 2, the cultural proxy is defined as the proportion of individuals who are 
married and who are unmarried, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 include the proportion of individuals 
living together as married and unmarried couples. Columns 3 and 4 show the results of a Multinomial 
Logit Model. Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% 
level.  
Table 6: Horizontal transmission of culture 
Dependent Variable: Living together as married or 
unmarried couples (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proportion of immigrants of the same origin by MSA 0.117 0.121 -2.518*** -3.173*** 
 
(0.095) (0.098) (0.428) (0.272) 
Home-country proportion of individuals living together 
 
0.174** 0.106* 
 
  
(0.064) (0.052) 
 
Proportion of immigrants of the same origin by MSA x  
  
3.329*** 4.153*** 
Home-country proportion of individuals living together  
  
(0.531) (0.348) 
Male 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
White -0.019** -0.016* -0.016* -0.017* 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Black -0.131*** -0.125*** -0.124*** -0.127*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Asian -0.033 -0.026 -0.026 -0.029 
 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) 
Age 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age2/100 -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
High school graduate -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Some college -0.043** -0.035* -0.030* -0.033** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
More college -0.037 -0.027 -0.023 -0.027 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country of origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,941 22,941 22,941 22,941 
R2 0.179 0.179 0.180 0.180 
Note: The home-country has been calculated by country of origin, age group, education level in all estimations. 
Estimates are weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.  
Appendix 
Table A1: The effect of culture on the living-together decision using Probit 
Models 
Dependent Variable: Living together 
as married or unmarried couples (1) (2) (3) 
Home-country proportion of  0.420*** 0.437** 0.518*** 
individuals living together (0.144) (0.193) (0.201) 
Male 1.121*** 1.119*** 1.119*** 
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
White -0.133*** -0.054* -0.052* 
 
(0.038) (0.028) (0.028) 
Black -0.452*** -0.373*** -0.366*** 
 
(0.066) (0.057) (0.055) 
Asian -0.291*** -0.087 -0.082 
 
(0.039) (0.065) (0.062) 
Age 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Age2/100 -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.040*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
High school graduate -0.167*** -0.125*** -0.117*** 
 
(0.026) (0.040) (0.036) 
Some college -0.209*** -0.148** -0.126* 
 
(0.050) (0.068) (0.065) 
More college -0.201*** -0.128 -0.104 
 
(0.065) (0.080) (0.076) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,941 22,941 22,941 
Notes: The home-country proportion of individuals living together as married and 
unmarried couples is calculated using information from the IPUMS International. The 
sample, obtained from the 5% microdata sample of the 2000 US Census, consists of 
immigrants aged 25 to 64 who arrived in the US at or before the age of 5 and who report 
a country of origin. In the first column, the home-country cultural proxy has been 
calculated by country of origin. The second column incorporates the cultural proxy 
measured by country of origin and age group. In the third column, our variable of interest 
has been calculated by country of origin, age group, and education level. Estimates are 
weighted. Robust standard errors, clustered by country of origin, are in parentheses. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
  
Table A2: Home-Country Censuses from IPUMS International 
Country Year IPUMSI 
Argentina 2001 
Austria 2001 
Bolivia 2001 
Brazil 2000 
Chile 2002 
Colombia 2005 
Costa Rica 2000 
Cuba 2002 
Dominican Republic 2002 
Ecuador 2001 
El Salvador 2007 
Ethiopia 2007 
France 2006 
Germany 1970 
Greece 2001 
Haiti 2003 
Hungary 2001 
Iran 2006 
Ireland 2002 
Italy 2001 
Jamaica 2001 
Jordan 2004 
Mexico 2000 
Morocco 2004 
Netherlands 2001 
Nicaragua 2005 
Panama 2000 
Peru 2007 
Philippines 2000 
Portugal 2001 
Romania 2002 
Spain 2001 
United Kingdom 2001 
Venezuela 2001 
Notes: This table shows the Censuses of the countries of 
origin utilized to calculate the cultural proxies. 
 
